The Second Amendment is the fly in the ointment-if not the trout in the milk-of constitutional interpretation. The accepted stratagem of constitutional scholars is to pretend that it is not there-or, at most, to pass it off in a footnote. But even in a footnote the constitutional protection of the right "to keep and bear arms" is an embarrassment; consider Tribe's claim in a footnote-the footnote that contains the only reference to the Second Amendment in his brilliant treatise-that
[t]he congressional debates . . . indicate that the sole concern of the second amendment's framers was to prevent such federal interferences with the state militia as would permit the establishment of a standing national army and the consequent destruction of local autonomy. 1 Totally ignoring it is equally embarrassing for, no matter how much we wish it would go away, it is there. It is almost enough to make one wish that the Constitution had remained unwritten.
Only the Humpty Dumpty-sic volo, sic jubeo-school of constitutional analysis appears capable of dealing with it.
2 The members of the plain meaning school, which is not to be confused with the "ordinary language" school of philosophy, are likely to be embarrassed by its words: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
3 Either this language does not have a plain meaning or it plainly forbids laws, at least federal laws, 4 outlawing the possession of arms, at least those arms, such as swords, rifles, and pistols, that existed when the Constitution was adopted. 5 The conclusion, however, that the Second Amendment forbids gun control laws is politically unacceptable to either the "conservatives" who believe that the government can constitutionally do whatever it wants (except violate the "Takings Clause" of the Fifth Amendment), or the "liberals" who believe in the First Amendment, equal opportunity, and gun control laws. The plain meaning of the Second Amendmentif there is one-is palatable only to libertarians who find the plain meaning of other parts of the Constitution, such as the Sixteenth Amendment, anathema.
2.
For Those who advocate interpreting the Constitution in accordance with the original intent of the framers are no better off. The original intent is ambiguous: either the framers intended to outlaw standing armies as Tribe suggests, 6 or they intended to outlaw gun control laws, neither conclusion being palatable to the liberal-conservative consensus, though true libertarians-i.e., anarchists-might embrace both horns of the dilemma. The only other conclusion that can be reached is the Second Amendment was intended to be a nullity, which reveals the framers in a rather farcical light.
Other schools of constitutional interpretation may have less difficulty with the constitutional right to bear arms, but only to the extent that they emulate Humpty Dumpty. Those who believe in "ordered liberty" 7 must surely be embarrassed that such a disorderly, uncivilized liberty as the right to bear arms is enshrined within our Bill of Rights. Those who believe that their principles are the principles that must govern constitutional and other legal decisions 8 can hardly be comfortable with the Second Amendment, unless, of course, their principles are opposed to gun control.
It thus appears that only anarchists, nihilists, 9 and solipsists can be comfortable with the right to bear arms. Clearly something has gone wrong with constitutional analysis.
It is easy enough to spot the mistake. When philosophers abandoned metaphysics, metaphysics found a new home in the law schools and in the courts and brought with it all its old baggage of paradox and irrelevancy. Once this is recognized, it is easy, in the abstract, to see what we must do to save the Constitution from its interpreters. The task of legal academics must be to dissolve, rather than resolve, problems of constitutional interpretation, just as philosophers since Wittgenstein have learned to dissolve metaphysical
6.
See supra text accompanying note 1. 
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problems. The key to such a dissolution lies in the recognition of the fact that there need be, and can be, no single correct way of analyzing constitutional issues. What is needed is simply the pragmatic recognition that different problems must be analyzed in different ways.
10
In this Essay I shall demonstrate how it is possible to get rid of the embarrassment of the Second Amendment and thus restore that much abused provision to its rightful position among our fundamental liberties. Only those who still dream of the one true mode of constitutional interpretation will be dissatisfied by my demonstration, for it turns on the creation of a new mode of analysis-which I call "original plain meaning"-that has never been tried before and which almost certainly cannot be applied to any other provision of the Constitution.
We have seen that neither "original intent" nor "plain meaning" can remove the embarrassment of the right to bear arms. The obvious solution-or, rather dissolution-lies in the discovery of another intent than those which the historical sources indicate motivated the framers or another meaning than the one we see so plainly in their words.
As it turns out, this can be done. Clearly the intent of the framers is to be found in the plain meaning of their words in 1789 when Congress adopted the Bill of 12 It turns out that the "right to bear arms" is the same as the right to display armorial bearings, 13 and that the 13. {The Court of Chivalry outlined the practice of bearing arms in its overview of the court's history and jurisidiction, noting that the court has probably existed since the Conquest. . . . In origin, no doubt, the court was essentially a military tribunal, the forerunner of courts martial . . . . As the origin of armorial bearings was . . . a method of identifying knights clothed in armour, it was natural that disputes with regard to the right to display a particular achievement on a shield should have fallen within the cognisance of this court. . . . The right to bear arms is, in my opinion, to be regarded as a dignity and not as property within the true sense of that term. . . .} It was not contended before me that armorial bearings were an incorporeal hereditament, and in any case it is clear that the right to bear arms is not a matter cognisable by the common law which seems to show that there is no property in arms in the legal sense, otherwise the courts of law would protect them.
Id. at 392.
original plain meaning of the Second Amendment is that the government shall not infringe upon one's right to be a lady or a gentleman. That the Second Amendment so skillfully avoids the use of sexist language suggests that, rather than a barbarous anachronism, it is one of the most principled provisions of the preCivil War Constitution. And once we understand this original plain meaning, the intent of the framers is revealed: since a well regulated militia requires officers, and officers must be gentlemen, 14 the framers intended to preserve the gentry from the leveling tendencies of the masses. 15 
